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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Director, Foreign Broadcast
Information Service

EXTENSION

NO.

FBIS-0432/85

DATE

21 October 1985

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

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OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. Deputy Director for
Science and Technology
Room 6E45 - Headquarters

FYI, some comments on FBIS
work related to China S&T.

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SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

CHINA SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY WORKING GROUP

25X1

3 OCT 1985

[redacted]
USSR Division
Science and Technology Branch
Foreign Broadcast Information Service
Central Intelligence Agency
P.O. Box 2604
Washington, D.C. 20013

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Dear [redacted]

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[redacted] I would like to pass on to you some comments on FBIS S&T publications that I have received as Chairman of the STIC China S&T Working Group. The responsiveness of the China Report -- Science and Technology publication to intelligence community needs has increased considerably over the last year. The China staff at FBIS should be commended for the excellent job that they have done. In particular the efforts of [redacted]

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[redacted] are to be commended. The China S&T Working Group members have also worked closely with the FBIS China staff to highlight the areas of most interest to the intelligence community in open source Chinese publications. More intelligence users are reading the S&T Report and finding it beneficial in their analyses. FBIS translations will be important inputs to the upcoming National Intelligence Estimate 13-7/2, "Science and Technology in China's Modernization."

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[redacted] The two summaries of tables of contents of Chinese journals published in 1984 and 1985 and the translations from the Chinese journal "Explosion and Shock Waves" were very valuable intelligence sources. Since nuclear intelligence is my own particular specialty, I have noted that through FBIS reports I have been able to identify 25 translations by over 70 Chinese scientists involved in nuclear weapons testing at the Northwest Institute of Nuclear Technology. These articles have resulted in significant findings about the progress and interests of the Chinese in developing nuclear warheads and underground nuclear testing techniques. Other analysts who follow Chinese supercomputers, missile R&D, biotechnology, and electronics have found the FBIS translations to be of equal value.

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[redacted] The recently adopted practice of including the list of references in the original Chinese with abstracts of articles has been useful and should be continued. These references help us

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
determine the degree to which the Chinese are relying on Soviet or U.S. research. It also gives us other leads as to related Chinese publications on the same subject. It is difficult to retrieve the original Chinese articles after they have been archived in the Library of Congress.

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The China S&T Working Group is well aware of the shortage of trained S&T Chinese language translators available to FBIS. We feel that it will be even more important to maintain good communications between China intelligence analysts and the FBIS staff as the volume of Chinese S&T publications increases. We look forward to your continued participation in the STIC China S&T Working Group.

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Chairman, China S&T Working Group
Scientific and Technical
Intelligence Committee

cc:

Chairman, STIC 
China S&T Working Group Members

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